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Appellant, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("Board"), respectfully
submits the following Brief in Reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE BY BAGGETTS
The procedural posture of this case outlined in the Baggetts' Response
Brief is not completely accurate. In their summation of the Board's Voluntary
Motion to Dismiss this appeal filed on November 10, 2003, the Baggetts state that
" [t]he Board, however fails to indicate that the only condition the Baggetts
required was that the Board follow Schmidt with respect to their property until it
has been remediated." Baggett Brief at 5. This statement is false. The Baggetts
coupled dismissal with conditions to which the Board could not agree. The
Baggetts requested a zero value for an indefinite period of time until their entire
property had been remediated. They would have been able to exclude the EPA
and UDEQ from remediating their property, therefore having a zero value on their
property in perpetuity. Furthermore, the Baggetts wanted their zero value land
decision at the Tax Commission level to be applied to all other property owners
within the designated Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site, whether the other
property owners had appealed their tax assessment to the Board and had provided
evidence of contamination of lead and arsenic. The Baggetts also requested costs
and fees associated with their appeal to which the Board agreed in principle.
Therefore, the Board could not stipulate to a dismissal under the first prong
of Utah R. App. P. 37(b). Essentially, the Baggetts held the Board's appeal
1

"hostage" with unreasonable conditions, knowing the Board could not agree.
These excessive requirements, which went beyond the scope of the Baggetts' Tax
Commission appeal as well as the Board's appeal to this Court, forced the Board
to file its Voluntary Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the second prong of Rule
37(b), Utah R. App. P. The Board filed its Voluntary Motion to Dismiss with the
intention of presenting the issue of the allocation of costs and fees to the Court to
determine in its sole discretion (once the Court had dismissed the Board's appeal).
Instead, the Court denied all motions and required and directed the Board to
prosecute its appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS CASE DIFFERS FROM SCHMIDT.

The facts in this case differ from those in Schmidt v. Utah State Tax
Comm yn, County Bd. of Equalization, Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d
690 (Utah 1999). While the subject property in this case is located within the
Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site (like the property in Schmidt), the evidence in
this case indicates that "a willing buyer" would be willing to pay more than zero
dollars to purchase the land, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12). There is no like
evidence contained in Schmidt. This case presents a different fact scenario
requiring a different result and holding.
The market evidence in Schmidt was much more uncertain than the impact
of contamination on the market in this case. The facts in this case are not
"substantially identical," "virtually identical" or even close to the "same" (as
2

Schmidt) as argued by the Baggetts. For instance, in Schmidt, little was known
about the contamination in the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site when the
Schmidts purchased and improved their land. In Schmidt it was uncertain
whether: (1) cleanup costs would be paid by responsible parties or property
owners; (2) the EPA and/or UDEQ would be involved in any remediation of the
contaminated Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site; or (3) the EPA and UDEQ
would continue sampling and testing the soil to gain a better understanding of the
depth of the contamination and how far the contamination was dispersed. See
Baggett Brief, Ex. "A" Schmidt v. County Board of Equalization, Final Decision,
October 7, 1997,ffl[8, 11 and 13. The Supreme Court in Schmidt indicated that
"[n]o agency had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the
[Schmidt] property." Schmidt at 693. In Schmidt, neither the EPA nor the UDEQ
had established a remediation plan to restore the contaminated property.
Conversely, in this case, both the EPA and UDEQ have established remediation
plans after taking comments from affected property owners for a two-year period.
Rat 34-35, 216-219, 277.1
Moreover, unlike the fact of contamination in Schmidt, the contamination
surrounding the Baggetts' property had been made known to the public 4 years
prior to the Baggetts' purchase of the subject property and had been made public
10 years prior to their 2002 tax assessment appeal. R. at 90-91, 235. Both the EPA
1

At least four contaminated residential properties in the Flagstaff-Davenport
Superfund Site have undergone remediation by the EPA and UDEQ at no cost to
the property owners.
3

and UDEQ have done considerable sampling and testing for contamination of the
properties located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site since Schmidt
was decided. R. at 217. At the time of Schmidt, there hadn't been any sampling
performed on the property by governmental agencies. Schmidt at 693. In fact, the
whole 2.7 acres of the Schmidt property had only been sampled in 3 spots.
Schmidt at 691. The EPA and the UDEQ now know substantially more
information about the depth of contamination and how far dispersed the
contamination is in the Superfund Site. The EPA and UDEQ have designated
specific parameters as the Superfund Site and have selected 20 properties that
require remediation. R. at 282-290. The EPA and UDEQ have placed the
Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site on CERCLIS list and on the National
Priorities List, where it currently is listed within the top 5 nationally. R. at 217.
The issue of contamination was either known by the Baggetts or should have been
known by the Baggetts.
In Schmidt, all of the uncertainty surrounding the contaminated property led
to the failure of the property owners to obtain conventional financing. The
Schmidts had been denied financing for their home by several (3) financial
institutions, due to the fact that the land evidenced levels of lead and arsenic
contamination. Schmidt at 691. See also Baggett Brief Ex. "A" ^[11 and 13
(wherein Tax Commission findings that the Schmidts were denied financing by
three lenders and the Board's appraisal did not take into account that a potential
buyer may be subject to the payment of the full costs of remediation). Conversely,
4

the Baggetts had no problem in obtaining conventional financing when they
purchased their property. R. at 90-91, 235. In fact, the appraisal used by them at
the time of their purchase did not value the Baggetts' land at zero dollars. R. at
91. Additionally, there is no longer any lender liability for financing the purchase
of contaminated property as in Schmidt, Sales in the Baggetts' Neighborhood
923, located within the parameters of the Superfund Site, are reflective of trends
within Salt Lake County. R. at 107. Fair market value sales are occurring within
the subject's Neighborhood 923 and within the Superfund Site with no apparent
adverse affect from contamination and are consistent with county-wide
conditions.3 R. at 111, 248-249. Since the Schmidt decision, residential properties
in the city of Herriman have been remediated at an estimated cost of $60,000 per
acre, with no institutional controls placed upon the residential properties. R. at
106-107, 146-147. With the success of the city of Herriman remediation, the
Board used the clean up costs associated with Herriman as a stigma reduction
available to taxpayers who have presented evidence of contamination and are
located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site. R. at 106-107. Schmidt
was based upon the Tax Commission's findings that: the Schmidts' denial of
financing was based upon uncertainty of the "environmental hazards" fl 1; no
determination could be made whether the superfund would pay for the remediation
*|8; and, the Board's appraisal did not take into account that a potential buyer
2

See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(E) (1994).
Sales of contaminated property have recently occurred within the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site and reflect no deduction for contamination.
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would be "subject to payment of the full costs of remediation of the property" ^13.
Baggett Brief Ex. "A." The above findings that led to the Schmidt decision are not
present in the Baggetts' appeal for the relevant lien date of January 1, 2002.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), "'Fair Market Value' means
the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." The Court in Schmidt stated that
"[w]hat is required of the Commission is that it value the property based on its
'fair market value.'" Schmidt at 692. With the uncertainty surrounding the
contaminated property in Schmidt, the Schmidts may not have been hypothetical
"willing buyers" having reasonable knowledge of the "relevant facts."
The Baggetts' situation is different. The knowledge of the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site and all surrounding issues can be imputed to the
knowledge that a hypothetical "willing buyer" would have regarding the "relevant
facts" when the Baggetts purchased their property in 1996, but more importantly
having that knowledge on the relevant lien date January 1, 2002. R. at 85, 90-91.
Even though the Baggetts interpret the "fair market value" statute to mean what
did they specifically know at the time of their specific purchase, such a
characterization is erroneous and irrelevant. The definition of "fair market value"
involves hypothetical willing buyers and sellers. In reviewing the definition of
"fair market value," the Utah Supreme Court previously stated that it is irrelevant
whether a "willing buyer" actually exists, instead, the "fair market value"
6

definition "contemplates nothing more than a hypothetical sale to a hypothetical
willing buyer during the tax year. The sale is a statutory fiction indulged in by
appraiser to arrive at fair market value." Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County v.
Utah State Tax Comm 'n ex rel Benchmark Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 888 (Utah 1993).
A hypothetical willing buyer would have known of the relevant facts surrounding
the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site at the time of the Baggetts' purchase in
1996 and most importantly on the lien date of January L 2002. The Baggetts
cannot plead ignorance to the "relevant facts" when such facts were present and
publicly known in 1996, as well as 2002. The standard is reasonable knowledge
of the relevant facts as of the lien date to a hypothetical willing buyer and willing
seller4, not a specific knowledge of all facts known by the Baggetts at the time of
their purchase six years before the relevant lien date. These above distinctions
between the Baggetts' appeal and the Schmidt decision are material and should
lead to a different result than the one reached by the Utah Supreme Court in
Schmidt.
Schmidt indicates that there is no single method of appraising contaminated
residential properties and that different facts may demand different results. The
Court stated that it has never established a single, exclusive method for fixing the
value of contaminated property and that it wasn't persuaded by cases in other
jurisdictions that mandated a valuation methodology. Schmidt at 692. By refusing

The Baggetts presented no appraisal evidence that a willing seller would sell its
land for zero dollars.
7

to adopt a specific methodology and holding that valuation is a question of fact,
the Court in Schmidt reaffirmed Questar Pipleline Co. and Utah Power & Light
Co., which both advocate a case-by-case analysis. In Questar, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that factual differences between two cases could drastically alter the
application of proper appraisal techniques. Questar Pipleline Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm % 850 P.2d 1175, 1178-79 (Utah 1993). In Utah Power, the Utah
Supreme Court found that "[t]he fact the Commission has followed a certain
procedure in the past does not commit it to do so eternally." Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm '«, 590 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1979). The Baggetts
urge the court to ignore this generally recognized legal determination and, in doing
so, attempt to persuade the Court under the false premise that the Baggetts' facts
and the Schmidt case are the "same, virtually identical, and substantially
identical." Baggett Brief at 11, 13-15. These statements are a substantial
mischaracterization of the facts of this appeal.
The Baggetts are attempting to confine not only the Tax Commission but
also the appellate courts to the same outcome of the Schmidt case "eternally." The
Baggetts' argument does not take into account that different facts may dictate a
different result.5 The Baggetts continue to argue that the Tax Commission is
constitutionally required to use the Schmidt "methodology" and even if not

5

The only fact similar between these two cases is that both properties are located
within the boundaries of the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site, contaminated
with various levels of lead and arsenic.

8

constitutionally required to do so that "[b]ased solely on the principles of common
sense and stare decisis, the Tax Commission is entitled to apply the same
methodology for similarly situated taxpayers." Baggett Brief at 15. The Baggetts
fail to adequately brief this argument, or provide any legal analysis supporting the
doctrine (perhaps because it does not apply to this case).
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[u]nder the doctrine of stare
decisis, once a point of law is decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of
the same or lower rank in subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue" State
v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). The
Baggetts' argument that the stare decisis doctrine applies fails because the issues
and facts in this case differ from the pertinent legal issues and facts in Schmidt.
Since a hypothetical willing buyer and seller would know that the EPA and UDEQ
will bear the cost of cleaning up the contamination, the present contamination is
not having an adverse effect on sales in the Baggetts' neighborhood. R. at 56,
111,230,238. That was not the case in Schmidt. See Schmidt at 692-693. See
also Baggett Brief Ex. "A"ffl|8& 13. Because the "relevant facts" in this case are
so different from the "relevant facts" in Schmidt, it is not appropriate to place a
zero value on this property when the record shows that the market attributes value
to these properties. R. at 90-91, 235-244.
Furthermore, the Court in Schmidt made clear that it declined to reach a
valuation methodology for contaminated property as a matter of law. Schmidt at
692-694. The legal issues relating to the Schmidt decision that the Baggetts argue
9

are binding precedent were either not brought to the Court's attention or officially
ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Schmidt. Schmidt is not binding
precedent on this Court, because the issues raised in this appeal have not been
decided by the Utah Supreme Court. Instead, as the United States Supreme Court
has held "[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the
attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so
decided as to constitute precedents (citations omitted)." Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S.
507, 510, 45 S.Ct. 148 (1925). Based upon the Baggetts mischaracterization of
the issues on appeal, the application of the stare decisis doctrine to this case would
be in error.
II.

THE BAGGETTS' CONSTITUTIONAL AND
EQUALIZATION ARGUMENTS ARE
INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS AND ISSUES
BEING REVIEWED ON APPEAL

As held many times by the Utah appellate courts, matters raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered. See Hamilton, et al. v. Salt Lake County
Sewerage Imp. DisL, 393 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1964).7

The Baggetts allude to an

Additionally, the Baggetts took the time to reframe the issues appealed as they
wished they had been appealed. Such a manipulation of the facts and issues
regarding this appeal still does not make the Baggetts5 case like Schmidt.
7

See Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970), holding
that "[o]rderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final settlement of
controversies, requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory or
theories of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter
change to some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-goround of litigation."
10

equalization argument throughout their brief, but do not brief or fully develop the
argument. Baggett Brief at 13. The Baggetts never attempted to present an
equalization and uniformity argument at the Tax Commission and therefore
nothing is contained in the record to support such an argument on appeal. The
only evidence in the record presented at the Tax Commission dealing with
uniformity and equalization was by the Board when its appraiser stated that the
$60,000 stigma deduction has been provided to other taxpayers located in the
Superfund Site if any evidence of contamination was present. R. at 108. Instead,
the Baggetts indicate that the Tax Commission would violate its Constitutional
mandate to ensure that property is assessed uniformly and equally if the Tax
Commission didn't decide the Baggett case in strict compliance with the outcome
reached in Schmidt. This argument fails for many reasons. First, the Tax
Commission is not constitutionally mandated or obligated to ensure that property
assessed in 2002 under a completely different fact scenario than was presented in
the Schmidt case in 1995 is uniform and equal to the outcome reached in Schmidt.
Second, the Baggetts just simply allude to a uniformity and equalization argument
but have never developed this argument at the Tax Commission level or on appeal
(possibly because of the difficulty with such a challenge to an assessment).

See also, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Ut Ct. App. 1987). "Further, the
rule that a legal theory may not be raised for the first time on appeal is 'to be
stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual questions
whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial (citations omitted)."
11

Even if the Baggetts had properly raised this issue, the Baggetts have not
made a valid claim that their property is not assessed uniformly and equally with
other properties. In Mountain Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT
86, 100 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2004), the taxpayer argued that because its property was
not assessed consistent with the assessment of one other property (Glenwild), that
the Tax Commission violated the constitutional uniformity and equalization
requirements. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer
must present evidence to establish that more than one property enjoyed the same
valuation treatment that Glenwild received. The Court stated:
Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution mandates the
uniform and equal assessment of property. Utah Const. Art. XIII, §
2, cl.l. Mountain Ranch's constitutional argument turns on the same
theory that animated its claim to statutory relief: that irrespective of
the accuracy of its fair market value assessment, the disparity
between the valuation and Glenwild's entitles it to an adjusted
valuation commensurate with Glenwild's. Without evidence to
establish that another property enjoyed the valuation treatment
afforded Glenwild, Mountain Ranch has no basis to support its
position that constitutional equality and uniformity may be achieved
by reducing Mountain Ranch's valuation.
Mountain Ranch Estates at 1211.
Like the taxpayer in Mountain Ranch Estates, the Baggetts have not
presented any evidence that other property owners enjoy different valuation
treatment. On the contrary, if the Tax Commission's decision is affirmed, the
Baggetts will receive better treatment than others in their neighborhood, without
an appraisal to support their value. As stated by the Tax Commission in Lazar v.
Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 02-0109 (2001):
12

By raising the equalization issue, Petitioner selects for himself a
difficult standard of proof and perhaps an ineffective approach to
resolving this valuation dispute. Equalization arguments generally
arise in property tax appeals when the valuation of the property
under appeal is markedly above the valuation of comparable
properties. In effect, this provision is intended to bring the valuation
of the property under appeal in line with the valuations of like
properties, even if the adjustment reduces the valuation of the
property to below market value. It is the Commission's position that
an adjustment in a valuation on a theory of equalization is warranted
only to correct an assessment which is an obvious outlier or where
the evidence indicates a systematic or pervasive under assessment of
similar properties.
Lazar opinion f 3.
The Baggetts did not introduce into evidence any comparables to indicate
that they are being treated differently than similarly situated property owners
located within the Superfund Site. But, if the Baggetts' land value is affirmed by
this Court, the Baggetts will not be uniform or equal to any other similarly situated
taxpayer within their Neighborhood 923, as well as those property owners located
within the designated Superfund Site whether they evidence any contamination.
R. at 141-142, 146-148,151-153, 245-247 and 389. Since, the other property
owners are being assessed at fair market value, because the market has dictated the
value of their property, the Baggetts would be receiving preferential unequal and
non-uniform treatment.
As indicated by the Board in its opening brief (but not addressed by the
Baggetts' Response Brief), the duty of an appraiser is to interpret the market and
the sales that are being consummated within the Superfund Site, not to go into the
market and dictate what land values are worth. R. at 153, Board Brief at 43-44.
13

If fair market value sales are occurring without any adverse affect because of
contamination or the properties location within the Superfund Site, then those
sales are most indicative of fair market value for ad valorem tax purposes. The
Board's methodology of interpreting the market sales occurring within the
Superfund Site, and providing a downward adjustment of $60,000 per acre as a
stigma deduction is consistent with the "willing buyer" "willing seller" standard,
whereas the Baggetts' methodology in this case is not. R. at 236-244.
In denying Mountain Ranch Estates' argument on uniformity and equality
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006(4), the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he property
owner cannot have both an absence of comparable properties and freedom from
the constraints of the fair market value standard of valuation." Mountain Ranch
Estates at 1211. This language is compelling when compared to the facts
associated with the Baggetts' appeal. The Baggetts did not submit any sales of
similar contaminated properties or an appraisal showing what the Baggetts'
property would be worth (once adjusted for contamination). Even without this
necessary evidence, the Baggetts attempt to free themselves "from the constraints
of the fair market value standard of valuation" that shows property is selling
within the designated superfund site for full fair market value irrespective of
contamination. R. at 135-137, 151-153, 245-247.
The Baggetts argue that the Board may apply a different methodology
under a different set of facts and circumstances, and that is exactly what the Board
did in valuing the Baggetts' land value at fair market value as dictated by the
14

actual market conditions of sales located within the parameters of the Superfund
Site (and then applying the $60,000 per acre stigma reduction, arriving at fair
market value with contamination). Baggett Brief at 15. The Board's appraisal is
the best indicator of fair market value for the Baggetts' property and because any
assessment of their land value at zero would make the Baggetts an arbitrary and
obvious outlier of underassessment, the Court should correct the error of the Tax
Commission's reduction of the Baggetts' land value to zero. The Tax
Commission erred in providing the Baggetts with a land value of zero, thus
making the Baggetts unequal and non-uniform to all other similarly situated
taxpayers within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site.
III.

MR. BAGGETT'S COST ESTIMATES WERE
NOT A RELIABLE INDICATOR OF "FAIR
MARKET VALUE/9

The Baggetts argue that uncertainty remains regarding the EPA and
UDEQ's remediation plan and the payment of the costs associated with the
Superfund Site remediation. The statement in the Baggetts' Response Brief that
"until remediation is completed and the EPA and UDEQ have paid all costs and
expenses, the Baggetts have nothing but promises" is inconsistent with their
previous position. Baggett Brief at 11. The Baggetts' whole case at the Tax
Commission and arguments contained in their response brief rests on the
"promises" of the EPA and UDEQ in its generated cleanup costs for the whole
Superfund Site. They argue that they only have "promises" when it comes to
remediation, but yet the Baggetts used the EPA's and UDEQ's costs estimates of
15

the so called "promises" to present their entire case. If there is so much
uncertainty with the EPA and UDEQ's remediation plan and costs, how could
these costs be used to quantify any true measure of what would be allocated to the
Baggetts' land? The Baggetts can't have it both ways.
Furthermore, as the Board argued in its Opening Brief these costs should
not have been deducted dollar for dollar from the land's assessed value (especially
now that the Baggetts have called into question the "promises" of the EPA and
UDEQ). Since the Baggetts did not submit an appraisal or independent opinion of
value (perhaps because an appraiser would not have valued their land at zero) their
claim that the EPA and UDEQ may never clean up their property, is suspect.
First, property is already being cleaned up and second, why is the EPA and
UDEQ's word as good as gold to the Baggetts when they are using the cost
estimates to produce their own estimates, but yet the EPA's word is nothing when
it states that the property is going to be cleaned up and at no cost to them?
The Baggetts further argue that even if Mr. Baggett's costs estimates were
off by 50%, it would still not change the economic determination of this case. The
Baggetts even go as far as to indicate that "Mr. Baggett bolstered the credibility of
his analysis by testifying that even if his analysis or the underlying Cost Estimates
were off by 50%, the Cost Estimates allocable to his property would still exceed
his land's assessed value." Baggett Brief at 17. The Board fails to see how a
witness' credibility is "bolstered" by stating that even if you are off by 50% you
have come up with a number in excess of any land value assessed by the
16

Assessor's office. By the same reasoning, the Assessor could send out its tax
valuation notices and indicate a high level, when that level is called into issue, the
Assessor could then "bolster" his credibility by indicating that even if the
assessment is off by 50%, it is still lower than other comparable sales so that
amount is justified for valuation purposes. If the Assessor were able to value
property under the same parameters as the Baggetts were able to submit their cost
estimates, there would be anarchy in the ad valorem property tax system.
Regardless of the above determination of the "credibility" of the cost
estimates, "what is required of the [Tax] Commission is that it value the property
based on its 'fair market value.'" Schmidt at 692. By taking Mr. Baggett's suspect
cost estimates that are based upon the "promises" of the EPA and UDEQ, the Tax
Commission failed in its duty to value the property at "fair market value" when it
simply deducted those costs dollar for dollar and valued the land at zero. The
record before the Tax Commission was lacking in credible evidence to arrive at a
"fair market value" of zero dollars for the land when the wealth of the evidence
contained in the record supports a finding consistent with the Board's appraisal.
The finding of the Tax Commission should be overturned.
Contrary to the Baggetts' "uncertainty" arguments, a substantial amount of
evidence regarding the properties located within the Superfund Site are present
that were not present in the Schmidt case. Even so, with less known about the
Superfund Site, the property owners in Schmidt presented an appraisal, coupled
with remediation costs and their denial of financing from several lenders. See
17

Schmidt. The only evidence the Baggetts submitted in support of their requested
value were the construction cost estimates of Mr. Baggett allocated out from the
construction cost estimates to mobilize both the EPA and UDEQ for the
remediation of the 20 properties located within the parameters of the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site. R. at 282-290. With such a limited amount of
evidence to support the Tax Commission's finding of a land value at zero, the
Baggetts failed to carry their burden of proof at the Tax Commission.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests that the court
reverse the Tax Commission's decision placing a zero value on the Baggetts' land
for the 2002 tax year. Additionally, the Board prays that the court order the Tax
Commission to enter a finding that the fair market value of the Baggetts' property
for the 2002 tax year is $364,800 as evidenced by the Board appraisal submitted
during the formal hearing on June 2, 2003.
DATED this

/

day of February, 2005.
DAVID E.YOCOM
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

THOMAS W. PETERS
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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ADDENDUM

CCT I 5 2002
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

DiSTttfCT ATTORNEY
.C'VJL DIVISION

Formal Hearing Decision and Order
Petitioner,

Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County, Utah,
Respondent.

Appeal No.

02-0109

Parcel. No.

1627160020

Tax Type

Property Tax

Tax Year

2001

Presiding:
Irene Rees. Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:
For Respondent:

f H Lazar, property owner
Jason Rose, Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney, and
CindaLou Johnson, appraiser, Salt Lake Assessor's Office
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner brings this appeal from a decision of the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization. This matter was argued in a Formal Hearing on September 5, 2002.
ISSUE AND APPLICABLE LAW
Petitioner raises an equalization issue, stating that his property is valued higher than like
properties. Statutory provisions bearing on this issue are as follows:

1.

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103 states in pertinent part:
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and
equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless
otherwise provided by law.

2.
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006 (4) directs the Commission to adjust property valuations "to
reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable properties if:
(a) the issue of equalization of property values is raised; and
(b) the commission determines that the property that is the subject of the appeal
deviates in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed value of comparable
properties.
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FACTS
The facts in evidence that are pertinent to this decision are as follows:
1.

This appeal involves a property tax assessment for tax year 2001.

2.

The subject property is a single family residence located in a planned unit development
(PUD) at 2106 East Connor Park Cove in Salt Lake County. The home is
"contemporary" style with 2,150 sq. ft. of above grade living space and a partially
finished basement. The lot is .09 acre.

3.

The subject property was initially assessed at $455,400 for tax year 2001. After hearing,
the Board of Equalization adjusted the value to $415,000.

4.

There are two models of home in the PUD and eleven homes altogether. The homes
were built over a period of years from 1992 to 1996.

5.

The subject property is one of five homes in the PUD that are the same model, size and
floor plan. The "proposed values" for these properties for tax year 2001, according to the
information available on the Assessor's web site, range from a low of $367,700 to a high
of $457,600. The County's records indicate physical differences among the properties,
but neither party put on evidence as to the particular features of these homes that may
account for differences in assessed values.

6.

The home at 2123 E. Connor Park Cove is very similar to the subject property. The 2001
"proposed value" for this property was $457,600. The property actually sold for
$415,000 in March of 2000,1 indicating that the 2001 assessment for that property was
too high.

7.

In preparation for the Formal Hearing, Respondent prepared an appraisal of the subject
property that indicates a market value of $406,800.
DISCUSSION
The subject property sits within a PUD in Salt Lake County. The PUD is small,

consisting of eleven homes, and, given that there are only two floor plans available, the
development is rather homogenous. Nevertheless, there may be differences among the properties,
such as basement finish, decks and patios that account for differences in market value.

The sale of this property was used as the best comparable sale in Respondent's appraisal of the
subject property.
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Petitioner opened his presentation with a recitation of his history of tax disputes with the
County concerning this property. Over the years, the subject property has been assessed at values
higher than most or all of the other properties in the development. Petitioner has appealed the
assessments nearly every year, and the Board of Equalization has reduced the value each time that
he has appealed. For tax year 2001, the subject property was again assessed at the high end of the
range of assessed values for this development. In fact, the subject property was assessed nearly
$90,000 more than the similar model home at 2124 E. Connor Park Cove.

Petitioner requests an adjustment to $400,000. However, he premises his request on an
equalization argument pursuant to section 59-2-1006 (4) of the Utah Code rather than a market
vaiue argument. We begin, then, by considering whether the facts of this case require an
adjustment to equalize the value of this property with like properties in the same development.

Section 59-2-1006 (4) of the Utah Code states that "the Commission shall adjust property
valuations to reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable properties if:
(a) the issue of equalization of property values raised; and (b) the commission determines that the
property that is the subject of the appeal deviates in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed
values of comparable properties.

By raising the equalization issue, Petitioner selects for himself a difficult standard of
proof and perhaps an ineffective approach to resolving this valuation dispute. Equalization
arguments generally arise in property tax appeals when the valuation of the property under appeal
is markedly above the valuation of comparable properties. In effect, this provision is intended to
bring the valuation of the property under appeal in line with the valuations of like properties, even
if the adjustment reduces the valuation of the property to below market value. It is the
Commission's position that an adjustment in a valuation on a theory of equalization is warranted
only to correct an assessment which is an obvious outlier or where the evidence indicates a
systematic or pervasive under assessment of similar properties.

In this case, the evidence indicates a wide range of values for the seemingly similar
homes in this development. It is also clear that the subject property has been routinely and
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erroneously assessed at the high end of the range,2 so that the Board of Equalization must adjust
the assessment on appeal. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not shown a systematic and pervasive
under assessment of like properties that would suggest some sort of discrimination in the
valuation of his property, nor has he shown how setting the value of his property at $400,000
would equalize his assessment with the other homes in the development, given that six of the
homes would still have lower assessments than the subject property and four would remain
substantially higher. Whatever errors there may be in the assessments of surrounding properties,3
those errors do not justify plucking a value from thin air and applying it to the subject property.

Even though Petitioner cannot prevail on his equalization argument, we are left with
evidence that tends to show that the subject property was overvalued in the initial assessment.
For instance, the same model of home in the same development sold in March 2000 for about
$415,000, a price that is significantly below the original assessment on Petitioner's home. The
Board of Equalization and the County Assessor's appraiser both agree that the sale of that home
is the best indicator of value and that the original value was too high. In fact, the County's
appraiser, after a closer evaluation of the subject and comparables in the area, estimated the
market value of the subject property to be $406,800. This value is in line with Petitioner's
estimated value of $400,000, and it falls within the range of the assessments of other properties in
the PUD.

Respondent has recommended an adjustment to $406,800, and supported that request
with substantial evidence. That value is in line with most of the other assessments of properties
in the development, the majority of which range from about $381,000 to $413,000, and
overcomes any equalization argument.

DECISION AND ORDER
On the evidence and testimony presented, the Commission finds the fair market value of
the subject property to be $406,800 as of January 1, 2001.
2

The wide range of values for similar properties in this PUD may indicate that errors in the
information on the building cards on these properties need attention, or that the unique characteristics of
these homes or lack of comparable sales impacts the effectiveness of the Assessor's mass appraisal system
in these cases.
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION:
DATED this

[_[

day of

/V/fr/prV

_, 2002.

Administrative Law Judge

The undersigned Commissioners have reviewed this matter and concur in this decision.

%&?d>z_

OLvw
Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Marc B. JohrteOn
Commissi/Jrfer

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the
date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13
et. seq.
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At the hearing, Respondent's appraiser testified that this neighborhood was scheduled for
reappraisal to update the data in the County's records.

